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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal to the Supreme Court from a Memorandum Decision and Order of the
District Court granting a Motion to Dismiss treated as a summary judgment entered by a Senior
Judge. The appeal is filed pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (c)(9). This Memorandum Decision
was issued by the Honorable Ron Schilling on December 28, 2011. The Final Judgment of
Dismissal was filed on February 27, 2012.
ISSUES PRESENTED
I.

ARE THE PARTIES HEREIN SUFFICIENTLY DISTINCT AND THE ISSUES

UNRESOLVED TO AVOID THE BAR OF RES JUDICATA?
II. EVEN IF RES JUDICATA APPLIES, ARE THE EQUITIES SUFFICIENT TO ALLOW
THE COMMENCEMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION UNDER CIVIL
PROCEDURE RULE 60(b) IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE?
III. ON THESE EQUITIES, SHOULD THE DISTRICT COURT AT LEAST HOLD A
HEARING PURSUANT TO IDAHO CRIMINAL RULE 46(e)(4) AND IDAHO CODE
SECTION 19-2927?
IV.

DID JUDGE SCHILLING FAIL TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE AUTOMATIC

EXONERATION PROVISION OF IDAHO CODE 19-2927 ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
There are no facts in dispute, as no hearing on the motion was conducted below and the State
did not contest the verified facts in the Complaint, the affidavit, exhibits, or the supplemental
materials supplied by the Plaintiff to the Court. Judge Schilling did not enter formal findings of fact
or conclusions of law. Accordingly, this Court should exercise free review over questions of
BRIEF FOR THE APPELLANT - 6

statutory and case law as applied to the issue of the summary dismissal of the Verified Amended
Complaint. State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796, 102 P3d 1115 (2004).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts stated herein are drawn from the Verified Amended Complaint found in the Record
at pages 22 to 38 and the Affidavit of David H. Leroy with Exhibits, pages 102 to 119. Hereinafter,
such references to Record pages or lines will be demoted as "R_ _ , L_ _"

On November 3ru,

2008, felony criminal defendant Elliot Bailey failed to appear in Court before the Honorable Thomas
Neville, District Judge. Judge Neville declared the $150,000 appearance bond posted by Sun Surety
Insurance (Rl 12) to be forfeited and issued a bench warrant. On that same date the Clerk of the
Court mailed a notice to a local bail agent, Steve Ellefson, who had been out of the employ of Sun
Surety for over two months. Rl 13 Sun Surety, a South Dakota based corporation, did not receive
any notice of the Defendant's failure to appear or the Court's forfeiture.

The Trial Court

Administrator's Office, nearly two months earlier had acknowledged receipt of Mr. Ellefson's
application to represent Lexington National Insurance, in a letter dated September 3, 2008. RI 16
Fortunately, for the ends of justice, Defendant Bailey was re-apprehended only three days
later and returned to the Court. Within three weeks, Judge Neville had received Bailey's guilty plea
upon which a six month sentence of incarceration was rendered in due course.
Only afterward, approximately four months later in March of 2009, did Sun Surety learn of
both the failure to appear and the declared forfeiture. Immediately, Sun Surety attempted to obtain
relief by engaging counsel and filing a Motion to Exonerate the Bail. A first Motion filed by Mr.
Ellefson in January, was denied by Judge Neville in March, but not on the merits. Instead, the Judge
refused to hear the issues because the Petition had a "lack of approval by the Trial Court
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Administrator's Office". It was denied "without prejudice". R 106
In response, a second Motion was presented to Judge Neville by Sun Surety's then local
attorney. It too was summarily denied in May of 2009 "without prejudice". R 107-108 The Court
thereon stated two grounds:
1. The Defendant did not appear to satisfactorily excuse his neglect within one hundred and

eighty days.
2. The bondsman posting the bail had not surrendered the Defendant to a jail facility within
one hundred and eighty days.
Both Motions were filed in the State v. Bailey criminal case in which none of the District
Court, the Administrative District Judge nor the Trial Court Administrators were stated parties. The
issue of a potential, defective notice to Sun Surety was never heard or decided by Judge Neville. The
question of equitable relief for the surety under Rule 46 (e)(l) was never argued to Judge Neville.
In November 2008, the former Rule, in part, mandated that the Clerk, "must, within five (5)
days, mail a written notice of forfeiture to the surety or its designated agent" and upon a failure to
do so that "the court shall then ... exonerate sureties".
No judgment or order noting prejudice or finality was ever entered in the criminal case. No
evidentiary hearing was ever held. Neither a third motion nor an appeal was filed by Sun Surety for
reasons not stated or explained.
Instead, naming these new parties, ra1smg these previously unaddressed issues, this
independent civil action for declaratory and equitable relief seeking exoneration of the bond was
brought in January of 2011, upon the Verified Complaint of Sun Surety Insurance Company. The
State filed a Motion to Dismiss which Sun Surety opposed by briefs, affidavits and exhibits. Both
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parties agreed that the matter could be considered for summary judgment. After argument, Judge
Shilling dismissed the Complaint solely upon the ground of the doctrine of Res Judicata.
At the time of the non-appearance of Mr. Bailey in November, of 2008, former Idaho Code
Section 19-2927 imposed a duty upon the court clerk to give notice of a failure to appear and
forfeiture as follows:
"If, without sufficient excuse, the defendant fails to appear before the
court upon any occasion when his presence has been ordered the
court must immediately direct the fact to be entered upon its
minutes, order the forfeiture of the undertaking of bail, or the
money deposited instead of bail, as the case may be, and order the
issuance of a bench warrant for the arrest of the defendant. The clerk
shall mail written notice within five (5) days of the forfeiture for failure
to appear to the last known address of the person posting the undertaking
of bail or, if the bail consists of a surety bond, to the surety or its designated
agent. A failure to give timely notice shall exonerate the bail or undertaking.
If at any time within one hundred eighty (180) days after such entry in the
minutes, the defendant appears and satisfactorily excuses his neglect, the
court shall direct the forfeiture of the undertaking or the deposit to be
exonerated.

If within one hundred eighty (180) days of the date of forfeiture, a person,
other than the defendant, who has provided bail for the defendant,
surrenders the defendant to the jail facility of the county which issued the
BRIEF FOR THE APPELLANT - 9

warrant, the undertaking of bail or deposits are thereby exonerated."
Consistent with this obligation, the Ada County Clerk's Office had been mailing like notices in other
cases directly to Sun Surety's President, Pat Wood, in South Dakota for approximately five years,
long before Mr. Ellefson had left the employ of the company. These notices, when received, allowed
Sun Surety to attempt to apprehend and return absconders. Such notices were sent by the Clerk in
other known cases, both before and after November 3rd , directly to Sun Surety and Mr. Wood. (See
R 117-118 as examples) Because no such notice was received timely in the Bailey case, no cure
could be attempted by Sun Surety during the 72 hours in which the Defendant remained at large.
ARGUMENT
I.

ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT, SUN SURETY WAS ENTITLED TO A PRESUMPTION THAT
THE BOND WAS ALREADY EXONERATED BY OPERATION OF LAW UNDER IDAHO
CODE 19-2927
For purposes of summary judgment, Judge Schilling was required to assume all facts and
inferences favorable to Sun surety before ruling to dismiss. On the pleading and record before him,
the Clerk's notice mailed to a former employee with no notice given directly to the surety or its
designated agent was pled as defective. As noted and claimed in its briefing to the Court below,
Idaho Code Section 19-2927, as in effect in November, 2008, provided that "failure to give timely
notice shall exonerate bail" (Emphasis added)
The language of said provision is specific, mandatory and nearly self-executing. Under the
text of the statute, the failure to give notice itself "exonerates" the bond.
An analysis of whether the language of Idaho Code 19-2927 1s self-executing and
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automatically exonerated the bond for all purposes is instructive. In Idaho, constitutional provisions
have been ruled self-executing, not requiring further action of the legislature, based upon the obvious
intent and effect of their text. Reuth v. State, 100 Idaho 203, 596 P2d 75, (1978), Renninger v. State,
70 Idaho 170, 213 P 2d 9111 (1950) (dealing with the public condemnation of private property).
Likewise, self-executing provisions also have been found or discussed as possible to create in
statutes, Clevenger v. Potlach Forests, Inc., 85 Idaho 193, P 2d 794 (1963), board duties, Allen v.
Smylie, 92 Idaho 846,452 P2d 343 (1964) court judgments, Bending v. Varin, 34 Idaho 587,202
P 567 (1921) and in private party contracts, Keesee v. Fetzek, 106 Idaho 507, 681 P2d 600 (1984).
However, even a self-executing provision of a statute or rule can not determine and declare
the existence of the fact upon which the law operates. Village of Kendrick v. Nelson, 13 Idaho 244,
89 P 755 (1907). In Kendrick, a municipal treasurer failed to perform her duties for a period of over
ten days, it was alleged. If so, a provision of the Idaho Code provided "the office shall be declared
vacant." The Idaho Supreme Court held that the board of village trustees was compelled to meet,
find facts and declare the vacancy even under the strong mandate of the legislative language. Id at
13 Idaho 249. That principle, applied to the instant facts, would suggest that the ultimate question
of whether the clerk's mailed notice was complaint must be addressed in a proper forum for finding
fact. However, because the notice was presumed defective for summary judgment purposes, the case
arguably should not have been dismissed.

Alternatively, a finding that the bond is already

exonerated could have been entered.

IL
THE FAILURE TO GIVE NOTICE TO SUN SURETY SHOULD CONSTITUTE AN
EQUITABLE BAR TO ANY COUNTY COURT ATTEMPT TO COLLECT ON THE BOND.
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Judge Schilling commented strongly and favorably upon the equitable factors that mitigated
toward giving Sun Surety relief from the forfeiture at page six of his Memorandum Opinion: "The
VERIFIED AMENDED COMPLAINT at pages 12-13 lists eleven compelling arguments supporting
why it would not be fair to forfeit the $150,000 posted by the Plaintiff." (R157, L18-20)
That list of "convincing" reasons which found favor with the District Court is as follows:
"A. The Clerk unreasonably failed to give the required mailed notice to the Plaintiff,

the Plaintiffs local agent resigned and left employment in mid-August, the
Defendants knew or should have known of the same, the Plaintiff previously gave
written notice to the Defendants to use the Sun Surety address for all forfeiture
notices and the Clerk had regularly done so.
B.

The Defendant was re-arrested locally, without the State's incurring any

substantial cost, inconvenience or prejudice.
C. The Plaintiff was completely and effectively precluded from participating in

locating and attempting to apprehend and return Bailey to earn an automatic
exoneration of the bond by both the failure to get notice and by Bailey's nearly
immediate re-arrest.
D. By the time the Plaintiff received any notice of the failure to appear, Bailey was
already serving his sentence in the case and for the crime upon which he failed to
appear.
E. Even without the participation of the Plaintiff, Bailey remained at large for fewer
than three days before he was re-arrested.
F.

Upon information and belief, Bailey offered some explanation mitigating
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voluntariness or willfulness of his violation of bail conditions when brought back
before the Court.
G. Upon information and belief, the State incurred no intangible costs in locating
and returning Bailey or in sentencing him three weeks after originally scheduled to
do so. Upon information and belief, Bailey served a 180 day Rider sentence, was
placed upon probation and is now at liberty in the community.
H. The public's interest in ensuring Bailey's appearance was served in this case.
The primary purpose of the bail bond agreement was effectuated when Bailey timely
appeared in Court three days later to be sentenced.

I. The sum of $150,000 is an extremely large sum of money for Sun Surety, as the
average size of its bonds in Idaho is approximately $3,500 to $5,000.
J. Because of the passage of time and diminution of real property values, and the
departure of the agent who wrote the bond from the Plaintiff's employ, Sun Surety
no longer appears to have any effective way to recover the sum of $150,000 against
any third party, should the forfeiture not be set aside.
K. To allow the forfeiture in full to stand, would effect a punitive measure on the
Plaintiff, contrary to the primary purpose of bail." R 33-34
To prevent just such an undue hardship on a surety and to avoid unconscionable windfalls
to the county courts, the Idaho Criminal Rules and the Idaho Code in November of 2008 imposed
clear and succinctly stated duties upon the court clerk by requiring actual, effective notice-giving to
the entity or its true agent posting bond. A failure of performance under either the Rule or the Code
carried a clearly defined penalty, mandating a bar to collection on the contract. As discussed above,
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per the statute, such "failure to give timely notice shall exonerate the bail." Idaho Code 19-2927,
as in effect November, 2008, emphasis added. Under the Rule, if notice was not mailed within five
days to the surety or its designated agent, "the court shall then exonerate the sureties". Idaho
Criminal Rule 46(e) as in effect November 2008, emphasis added.

If the notice was defective in fact, as pled by Sun Surety in its Verified Amended Complaint,
the county courts should not be equitably entitled to pursue a forfeiture windfall. In State v. Fry, 128
Idaho 50,910 P 2d 164 (Ct. App. 1994), the Court suggested an equitable balancing test with criteria
for the consideration of exoneration. The clerk's act constitutes non-compliant conduct. The Court
applies the doctrine of unclean hands in equity by evaluating the conduct of both parties to consider
relief. Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 92 P 3d 492 (2004).
Preliminarily, the $150,000 bond appears to be exonerated by operation oflaw and the clerks
error. Sun Surety asks this Court to so hold, reversing Judge Schilling's dismissal. With that
perspective and effect, the remaining question becomes in what forum should the county courts be
accorded a hearing, if they wish to attempt to collect on the bond and contest the automatic
exoneration.
III.

THE RECORD IN STATE V. BAILEY SHOWS NO DAMAGE, COST OR DISRUPTION TO
THE COUNTY COURTS ACCRUED FROM THE 72 HOUR ABSENCE OF MR. BAILEY.
The Appellant asked that the entire record of the lower court criminal in which the bond was
posted, State v. Bailey, be included as part of the record herein. Rl66. Over objection, Judge
Schilling permitted that supplementation. RI 74-175 Sun Surety sought that additional material so
that this Court, on review, could assure itself of any and all details related to the conduct and
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conclusion of Mr. Bailey's felony matter and not be confined solely to the extracts submitted to the
court below.
The State v. Bailey complete case files are found now in our Record, second icon,
(hereinafter "R2") at pages 1 through 81. The following entries confirm that Bailey absconded on
November 3rd , and next appeared after apprehension, restored to the custody of the Ada County
Sheriff, no later than November 6th , some three days or 72 hours later:
1. The Docket entry for 11/3/2008 notes: "Warrant Issued-Bench Bond amount

500,000.00 Failure to Appear"
2. On 11/7/2008, the Docket reads "Booked into Jail on 11/06/08"
3. The 11/7/2008 entry also notes "warrant returned: Failure to Appear" R2,3
(See also R2, 51 and R2, 56)
At no point in this record below, is any claim for additional costs or expenses incurred by the
Sheriff in re-arresting Bailey presented or documented. The Court demonstrably suffered no
disruptions, except the time lost at calling the case on November 3rd without the Defendant present
and the related small amount of administrative time expanded to issue and circulate the warrant. R
2,54
Thus, the delay in court process, against which Sun Surety bonded, appears to be no more
than 72 hours with negligible incremental costs incurred. Mr. Bailey was not lost to the system and
promptly pled guilty on November 241\ just as he had been scheduled to on November 3rd. R 2, 5657. If, as Idaho courts have held, "the primary purpose of a bail bond ... is to effectuate the
defendant's presence in court", the $150,000 penalty proposed against Sun Surety is grossly punitive
and unwarranted. State v. Rupp, 123 Idaho 1,2, 843 P2d 151 (1992).
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IV.
AT A MINIMUM, A HEARING UNDERIDAHOCRIMINALRULE46(e)(4)ORAS TO
THE APPLICATION OF IDAHO CODE SECTION 19-2927 SHOULD BE HELD TO ADDRESS
THIS EQUITABLE UNFAIRNESS.
As noted above, both the criminal rules and the state code would seem to promise Sun Surety
some potential for relief, IF the notice of forfeiture was not timely given or lawfully directed by the
court clerk. Both mandate that the notices must have been mailed to the last known address at the
"surety or its designated agent." Paragraphs 10 through 17 of the Verified Amended Complaint
describe that:
1. Effective June 1, 2003 and after the county clerk and courts were on written notice
that Patrick Wood in Rapid City, South Dakota was the agent for receiving statutory
notices.
2. In July 2003, the Assistant Trial Court Administrator acknowledged the Sun
Surety agent information, but stated they would only mail to the person posting the
bond.
3. Nevertheless, the Ada County Clerk continued to regularly mail such notices to
Mr. Wood from 2003 through October of 2008, especially including the months of
August, September and October immediately preceding Mr. Bailey's non-appearance
in November.
4. From mid-August, 2008 onward the former Sun Surety agent who had posted the
Bailey bond, Steve Ellefson, was no longer employed by Sun Surety. In fact, he was
working for a competitor, Lexington National Insurance.
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5. On November 3rd , when the forfeiture occurred and during the five days following
when the Clerk was required to mail the notice, Steve Ellefson was not a "designated
agent" for Sun Surety Insurance, the entity which posted the Bailey Bond.
6. Nevertheless, the Ada County Clerk sent the required notice to Mr. Ellefson at
"P.O. Box 7985, Boise, Idaho 83707" instead ofto Sun Surety or Mr. Wood at "21
Main Street, Rapid City, South Dakota 57701 ". R24-24
Sun Surety contends that this notice is patently defective on its face and triggers the relief
provisions of the statute and the rule. Presumably, the county courts would defend by claiming the
mailing to Mr. Ellefson was adequate. No hearing on this issue has been held to date, but should be,
if necessary, to address the equitable unfairness described above. A Rule 46( e)(4) hearing could
even take place within the State v. Bailey case before Judge Neville, should this Court order one.
A Section 19-2927 determination could be had in either the Bailey case or in an independent civil
proceeding such as Sun Surety filed herein. The Appellant believes that Judge Schilling has wrongly
determined that such an independent action is barred by res judicata.
V.
THE PARTIES

HEREIN ARE SUFFICIENTLY DISTINCT AND THE ISSUES

UNRESOLVED SO AS TO ALLOW THE COURT TO A VOID APPLYING RES JUDICATA
The Doctrine of Res Judicata is an issue facing the Court in the consideration of this appeal, but only
as to whether an independent civil action is allowable at law. Presented here is the question of
whether a non-party's motion filed in a criminal case and twice denied without prejudice and without
hearing constitutes a bar to an independent civil action later filed between different but related
parties. A careful analysis of the clearly stated rules of that doctrine suggests that essential elements
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necessary to preclude the filing and litigation of this complaint do not exist.
At the outset, this Appellant concedes that a more conventional and perhaps preferable
procedure of disputing Judge Neville's two denials of the original Motions to Exonerate might have
been the timely filing of a third motion, a motion for reconsideration or an appeal. However, where
the earlier motions were denied without prejudice, without hearings and on narrowly stated grounds,
the non-utilization of a conventional procedural device does not necessarily preclude this later filed
action.
The Idaho Supreme Court has been both active and specific in defining when "claim
preclusion" or "issue preclusion" prevent the filing of subsequent litigation. In Ticor Title Company
v. Stanion, 144 Id. 119, 157 P3d 613 (2007) that Court stated the following definitions and rules:
"The doctrine of res judicata governs both claim preclusion
(true res judicata) and issue preclusion ( collateral estoppel).
Claim preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same
parties to the same cause of action ... which might have been
made." Issue preclusion protects litigants from litigating on
identical issue with the same party or its privy. . . Separate tests
are used to determine whether claim preclusion or issue preclusion
applies. Res judicata serves three fundamental purposes: (1) it
preserves the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution against the
corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same matter were twice
litigated to inconsistent results; (2) it serves the public interest in
protecting the courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation;
and (3) it advances the private interest in repose from the harassment
of repetitive claims ...
1. Issue Preclusion
Issue preclusion protects litigants from having to relitigate an identical
issue in a subsequent action. Five factors are required in order for issue preclusion
to bar the relitigation of an issue determined in a prior proceeding:
(1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided
in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the
issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was
a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation;
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and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity
with a party to the litigation.
2. Claim Preclusion
For claim preclusion to bar a subsequent action there are three requirements:
(1) same parties; (2) same claim; and (3) final judgment.
Id. at 144 Idaho 123-124 (citations omitted)

Applying those standards, neither issue nor claim preclusion bars this action. Neither
"corrosive disrespect" for results nor the "harassment of repetitive claims" is threatened here. To
the contrary, contrasted with the earlier, abrupt motion denials, this action presents several different
features. While the formal parties in the criminal litigation were the State ofldaho represented by
the Ada County Prosecutor as Plaintiff, and Elliott Bailey, appearing with defense counsel, it is true
that Sun Surety was the movant which sponsored or potentially benefitted from the two Motions.
Thus, arguably, the "Plaintiff' in both of the earlier Motions and in this litigation are identical.
However, the four named Defendants herein were never parties directly or indirectly in the criminal
case. They had no formal role, produced no result and made no appearances before Judge Neville.
It is true that the first Motion denied by the District Judge did make reference to a failure to approve
by the Trial Court Administrator's Office. The State argues at page eight ofits Memorandum, citing
one federal and one California case that "officers of the same government" are necessarily privities
who stand in the shoes of the State of Idaho for the purpose of qualifying as the same party in the
earlier case. Ticor Title Company, supra, does recognize as a privity, a current party which derives
its interests in the matter from one who was earlier a party. Id. at 144 Idaho 124-126. However, it
is far from clear that the unique and specific interests which these Defendants have in contesting this
bond forfeiture relate in any particular to the purpose and focus of the "State ofldaho" in prosecuting
the criminal case or to those of Mr. Bailey who wished merely to remain free on the surety bond.
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Sun Surety urges that the "privity" claimed is insufficient here.
Nevertheless, three other elements of the issue and claim preclusion tests are clearly absent
here.
Sun Surety was not given a "full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the
earlier case." Instead, summarily, twice, Judge Neville declined or refused to reach the merits of the
proposition of expungement by granting summary orders without hearings. He encouraged or
permitted further applications by deciding both motions "without prejudice". As noted above,
atypically, Sun Surety did not fully proceed or protest that opportunity at that time. Nevertheless,
the Idaho Supreme Court tenet requires a "full and fair opportunity to litigate". Judge Neville never
heard such a proceeding.
Further, the issues presented in this case are not "identical to the issue presented" in the prior
litigation. Here, for the first time, Sun Surety has raised the defense of a failure by the Clerk to give
competent notice and has urged an evidentiary hearing on alternative theories of relief, including
equitable claims under Rule 46(e)(4) that were never earlier advanced.
Of equal significance, there never was "a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation."
The final judgments rule is a requirement for both issue preclusion and claim preclusion. The
boilerplate principle on this point is succinct:
"REQUIREMENT OF FINALITY. The rules of Res Judicata are
applicable only when a final judgment is rendered. However, for
purposes of issue preclusion as distinguished from merger and bar,
"final judgment" includes any adjudication of an issue in another
action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded
conclusive effect." The Restatement of the Law of Judgments, 2nd ,
Section 13, The American Law Institute (1982)
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The Idaho Supreme Court has cited this treatise provision favorably.

Eastern Idaho

Agricultural Credit Association v. Neibaur, 133 Idaho 402, 408, 987 P 2d, 314 (1999).
Typically, a dismissal without prejudice does not result in issue preclusion. Id. at 408
Instead, dismissal without prejudice means that the claimant has the right to sue again on the same
cause of action and prevents the decree of dismissal from operating as a bar to that subsequent suit.
McConnell v. Attorney General of Texas, 878 S.W. 2d 281 (Tex. App. 1994) To fail to allow an
action by a party previously dismissed without prejudice may raise due process complications, if that
party never had a chance to present their evidence and arguments on a given claim in an earlier
proceeding. Haavisto v. Perpich, 498 N.W. 2d 746 (Minn. App. 1993).
Thus, the question before this Court, in its most refined form, is whether Judge Neville's
earlier hand written notations constitute a sufficiently firm and broad procedural reflection to be
given conclusive effect.
The Idaho Supreme Court directs us to use this test:
"Under Comment g. entitled. "Criteria for determining finality in
the application of issue preclusion," the Restatement reads:
"Preclusion should be refused if the prior decision was avowedly
tentative. On the other hand, that the parties were fully heard, that
the court supported its decision with a reasoned opinion, that the
decision was subject to appeal or was in fact reviewed on appeal,
are factors supporting the conclusion that the decision is final for
the purpose of preclusion."

Eastern Idaho Credit Association, supra at 133 Idaho 320, citing the Restatement of
Judgments, 2nd supra Section 13, comment G (1982).
Here, as is evident from the terse, handwritten notations, the Court did not and did not intend
to support its decision with a reasoned opinion. Instead, by inviting further proceedings, "without
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prejudice," Judge Neville clearly contemplated that the parties would in some form, at some time
subsequent, be more fully heard on the question of exoneration. Unfortunately, that did not happen
before him in 2009. Instead, this action was filed in 2010.
For each and all ofthe above cited reasons, Judge Schilling's reasoned conclusion was wrong
and this Court should not impose the doctrine of res judicata to bar the instant litigation. The
arguably different parties clearly failed to be fully heard on the full range of issues presented here
and Sun Surety did not receive final rulings thereon.
VI.
SUN SURETY CAN NOT ADEQUATELY EXPLAIN ITS EARLIER FAILURE TO
FURTHER PROCEED, BUT SHOULD NOT HAVE TO ON THESE FACTS
As noted above, this attempt by civil litigation to obtain bond forfeiture relief by equitable
declaration well after the failure to appear and without continuing to pursue procedures in the
criminal case is not typical. Nor should it be preferred. But because of the disproportionate equities
herein, Judge Neville's failure to ever reach the substantive issue, and the specific provisions of
Section 19-2927 and Rule 46(e)(4), a ruling or hearing should not be summarily precluded. In an
independent action, all parties and all issues, including a forseeable, likely soon-to-be imposed
demand for payment by the county courts, can be cleanly litigated, if the dismissal below is
overturned.

Alternatively, if Sun Surety is remanded to the civil or criminal courts for a

determination of fact as to whether the "automatic" exoneration ofldaho Code 19-2927 applies here,
the parties can conduct themselves accordingly. One or the other of said procedures should be
directed and permitted by this Court on appeal.
Even if res judicata applies at law, the principles of equity allow a narrow window for the
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consideration of relief in Idaho. Rule 60 (b) is the provision of our civil procedure process which
allows an Idaho Court to avoid prior final orders on the grounds of equity. This Court has been clear
and consistent in stating that this safety value, via an independent action in equity, "available only
rarely and under the most exceptional circumstances", is not to be used simply to relitigate
determined issues. Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 2012 WL 1970066, - - - - P 3d - - (2012), Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328,612 P2d 1175 (1980). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b) allows post-judgment relief in the instance of 'other misconduct of an adverse party. It also
contains a catchall provision which operates for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation
of the judgment."
Such an action for independent equitable relief must be brought within a reasonable time to
obtain revision of the earlier ruling. Compton v. Compton 101 Idaho 328, 334, 612 P 2d 1175,
(1980), Campbell v. Kildew, 141 Idaho 640, 115 P 3d 731 (2005).
Most such claims for relief have been based upon the alleged or proved fraud of the party
against whom relief is sought. Campbell v. Kildew, 141 Idaho 640, 115 P 3d 731 (2005).
However, if such allegations of fraud (or here it is contended official misconduct and great
inequity) are sufficient, they should be held to overcome a motion to dismiss and to require a hearing
before the District Court. Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535, 835 P 3d 1346 (1992). Therein, an
untimely filing of an independent action for relief was allowed and a dismissal overturned and the
case remanded for hearing to determine whether a husband had abided by his promise to be fair in
a divorce case property division. Id at 122 Idaho 538. This Court has favorably considered, although
not applied on other facts, the Rule 60(b) principle in criminal cases. In State v. Peterson 153 Idaho
157, 280 P 3d 184, 192 (2012) it declined to apply the concept simply because the criminal
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defendant could point to no sufficient degree of"fraud or overreaching". See also State v. Hartung.
150 Idaho 326,246 P 3d 979 (2011) and State v. Griffith, 140 Idaho 616, 97 P3d 483 (2004).
Thus, if, as here, the fiscal inequity and unlawful act of the clerk rise to the standard of
"overreacting", a hearing could and should be granted herein.
CONCLUSION
For each and all of the above stated reasons and arguments, the Appellant respectfully
requests this Court to reverse Judge Schilling's dismissal and remand the cause to him or to Judge
Neville in State v. Bailey for further proceedings.
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